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INTRODUCTION
 In the autumn of 1979, my mother killed the cats. We had seven; one 
morning, she grabbed four, took them to the vet and had them put to sleep. 
She said she didn’t want to feed them anymore. It occurred to me that she 
might be going mad.1
 So Marion Roach began her powerful and provocative article, Another Name for 
Madness, in the Sunday magazine section of the New York Times on January 16, 
1983.2 The article detailed Ms. Roach’s mother’s struggles with Alzheimer’s disease, 
and how her mother’s illness had affected the Roach family.3
 I first met Ms. Roach in 1981, a few years after I had changed the direction of 
my law practice from traditional estate planning to dealing primarily with the legal 
problems of aging and later life—an area of law that became known as “elder law” in 
the mid-1980s.4 I provided advice to the members of the Roach family as the Roaches 
began the difficult process of making legal arrangements for the care and support of 
Ms. Roach’s Alzheimer’s-aff licted mother.5
1. See Marion Roach, Another Name for Madness, N.Y. Times Mag. (Jan. 16, 1983), http://www.nytimes.
com/1983/01/16/magazine/another-name-for-madness.html.
2. Ms. Roach later published a similarly titled book that expanded on her January 1983 article. See Marion 
Roach, Another Name for Madness 195 (1985) (discussing the author’s professional interactions 
with the Roach family).
3. In 1980, the over-sixty-five population in the United States was approximately twenty-five million (11%), 
compared to today’s over-sixty-five population, which is roughly forty million (13%). Carrie A. 
Werner, U.S. Census Bureau, The Older Population: 2010 3 (2011), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-09.pdf. Between 2000 and 2010, the eighty-five to ninety-four 
age group saw the fastest growth of any age group in that decade. Id. at 4. Alzheimer’s disease most 
frequently affects older persons; younger persons such as Ms. Roach’s mother, who was fifty-four years 
old when the disease struck her, do suffer from Alzheimer’s disease, but the under-sixty-five cohort 
comprises roughly 4% of sufferers, while approximately one-third of persons aged eighty-five or older 
have the disease. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, 2013 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures 15 (2013), 
available at http://www.alz.org/downloads/facts_figures_2013.pdf. Perhaps it is because the over-sixty-
five population in the United States was significantly lower in the early 1980s than in the years that 
followed that the incidence of the disease was not as noticeable then as it has been in more recent years. 
From my perspective, in 1980 Alzheimer’s disease was an “orphan” illness and individuals who had 
significant cognitive loss were often misdiagnosed as suffering from “hardening of the arteries” or multi-
infarct dementia. Little money was being spent on understanding or researching Alzheimer’s disease.
4. Ms. Roach visited me to discuss how to manage her mother’s financial affairs, how to ensure her mother 
would receive proper medical care, and how to pay for the significant long-term care expenses (which 
included determining whether the Medicaid program might be an available resource). Other major 
concerns of Ms. Roach’s related to decisionmaking for her mother at the end of her life were: How 
would her mother’s wishes be implemented? Would the health care providers honor those wishes? What 
did the law say about Marion’s rights to enforce those wishes? In my experience, the issues raised in the 
Roach case are typical of the problems that elder law attorneys face.
5. The threshold question in many cases presented to the elder law practitioner is “Who is the client?” 
This is particularly true when the older person has diminished cognitive capacity. Is the client the 
spouse? The children? The older person with the medical issues? All of them? For an overview of 
various differing opinions and suggested best practices concerning this issue, see generally Model 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6, R 1.7, R 1.14 (1983); Professionalism & Ethics Comm. of the 
Nat’l Acad. of Elder Law Attorneys, Aspirational Standards for the Practice of Elder 
Law with Commentaries (2005), available at http://www.naela.org/App_Themes/Public/PDF/
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 As I soon learned from working with the Roach family and other clients who 
sought my counsel after I began focusing on elder law, “later life” often meant “end 
of life,” with these clients in desperate need of advice about the legal and practical 
issues they were facing as they made health care decisions for family members who 
had diminished quality of life or were at the end of life. 
 Elder law attorneys like to say that this new area of the law has turned the focus 
of legal services from planning for the disposition of a person’s assets at death to the 
problems attendant to disposing of assets during one’s life. How should the financial 
affairs of a person who is incapacitated be managed? Is a guardianship necessary? 
Who decides where an incapacitated person will reside? How is incapacity to be 
determined? How is the cost of chronic care to be financed? Is this cost to be an 
individual responsibility or should taxpayer-funded public health care initiatives be 
expanded to cover long-term care expenses?
 Articles like Ms. Roach’s helped make the nation aware that a large segment of 
the population was alive but with diminished physical and mental capacity—a group 
with significantly diminished quality of life who could no longer care for themselves 
nor express their wishes, particularly about the kind of medical care and treatment 
they would want, or would wish to forgo, at the end of life. Recent census figures 
show that 50% of persons over the age of eighty-five have limited functioning and 
need assistance with performing the activities of daily living.6 How to make end-of-
life decisions for such persons is no longer a purely theoretical exercise.
 As I became more involved in end-of-life and “right-to-die” issues (I joined the 
Board of Directors of the Society for the Right to Die, later known as Choice in 
Dying after a merger with Concern for Dying), society too began to discuss and 
debate issues about death, dying, and individual rights at the end of life. Meanwhile, 
the courts began to deal with more cases that touched on these issues.7
 The legal debate over individual rights to control one’s life and death can be 
traced back to Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s statement in the Schloendorff v. Society of 
the New York Hospital opinion, written in 1914 when he sat on the New York Court 
of Appeals, that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”8 However, U.S. courts then 
took a long vacation from dealing with end-of-life issues—a vacation that ended 
with the 1976 New Jersey Supreme Court decision in In re Quinlan.9
 Essentially, the Quinlan court held that a person’s right to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment—a constitutionally protected interest—was not surrendered as a 
Media/AspirationalStandards.pdf; Stuart D. Zimring, Ethical Issues in Representing Seniors, Persons with 
Disabilities and Their Families, 4 Nat’l Acad. Elder L. Att’ys J. 125 (2008).
6. U.S. Census Bureau, Sixty-Five Plus in the United States (1995), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/1/statbrief/sb95_8.pdf.
7. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
8. 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914). The phrase “of . . . sound mind” is relevant to a number of the ideas and 
concerns discussed in the various articles in this publication.
9. See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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result of a person’s incapacity, but rather, that a person’s wishes could be expressed 
and enforced by another person in appropriate circumstances.10 This concept—that a 
close family member may make a “substituted judgment”11 decision about treatment 
to be provided or not—was vigorously debated over the succeeding years and, in 
time, many states came to accept some form of substituted judgment.12
 New York’s jurisprudence, however, initially took a different track, rejecting the 
substituted judgment approach for a strict test requiring clear and convincing evidence 
of a patient’s wishes. As discussed in his luncheon presentation at the symposium 
that gave rise to this publication, former New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Sol 
Wachtler, whose paper is published in this issue, wrote the 1980 opinion in the 
companion cases In re Storar13 and Eichner v. Dillon,14 which rejected the concept of 
substituted judgment and instead imposed the clear and convincing evidence rule.
 These decisions held that while a patient’s common law right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment was paramount to the physician’s duty to provide medical care, 
the evidence of the patient’s wishes to forgo treatment must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence; no “substituted judgment” or “best interests” test could 
10. See id. at 661–64.
11. As its name suggests, “substituted judgment” means that the surrogate decisionmaker—whether a 
guardian, a conservator, an agent under a health care proxy, or some other person authorized to make 
health care decisions on behalf of a particular patient—must, when possible, make end-of-life decisions 
on behalf of the patient that are in accordance with the known wishes of the patient; it does not mean 
that the decisionmaker substitutes her or his values and beliefs for those of the patient. Under many 
states’ laws, the surrogate decisionmaker must try to ascertain what the patient would have decided if able 
to communicate a decision. If the surrogate decisionmaker is unable to make such a decision, the law 
generally allows him or her to follow a “best interests” standard. For example, under New York’s Health 
Care Proxy Law, the agent must make decisions “in accordance with the principal’s wishes, including the 
principal’s religious and moral beliefs, or, if the principal’s wishes are not reasonably known and cannot 
with reasonable diligence be ascertained, in accordance with the principal’s best interests . . . .” N.Y. Pub. 
Health Law § 2982(2)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2013). New York’s Family Health Care Decisions Act, 
adopted in 2010, states that “the surrogate shall make health care decisions: (i) in accordance with the 
patient’s wishes, including the patient’s religious and moral beliefs; or (ii) if the patient’s wishes are not 
reasonably known and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, in accordance with the patient’s 
best interests.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2994-d(4) (McKinney 2013). The New York law governing 
guardianships permits guardians to make treatment decisions according to the decisionmaking standard 
set forth in section 2994-d(4). N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.22(a)(8) (McKinney 2013). These statutes 
clearly distinguish between the substituted-judgment approach and a best-interests one.
12. “Many States, for example, now permit ‘living wills,’ surrogate health-care decisionmaking, and the 
withdrawal or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716. See also Alan 
Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in From Birth to Death and Bench to Clinic: The Hastings Center 
Bioethics Briefing for Journalists, Policymakers, and Campaigns 51–54 (Mary Crowley ed., 
2008) (“When individuals have not made manifest their decisions about medical care, the ethical and 
legal protocol is to implement a person’s presumed wishes through a doctrine known as ‘substituted 
judgment.’ Under this doctrine, a surrogate must make decisions for a patient. If the patient has not 
appointed a surrogate in an advance directive, close family members are ethically and legally empowered 
to make decisions for the patient.”).
13. 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
14. See id.
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suffice.15 The court found that while the evidence of the wishes of Brother Joseph 
Fox (the patient in Eichner), had met the clear and convincing evidence test, the 
evidence concerning John Storar (the patient in the companion case), had not.16
 I was deeply distressed by the Storar decision. John Storar was a fifty-two-year-
old man who was profoundly mentally retarded.17 He had undergone radiation for 
bladder cancer that metastasized to his lungs, with probable metastasis to his liver 
and brain as well.18 He was receiving blood transfusions because of bladder bleeding; 
his mother—who was his court-appointed guardian—refused to consent to further 
transfusions, prompting the hospital to seek a court order allowing continuation of 
the transfusions.19 The Court of Appeals decided that the treatment had to be 
continued because, since Mr. Storar had been retarded from birth, he could never 
have expressed his wishes regarding the treatment; thus, the clear and convincing 
evidence test could not, by definition, be met.20 The court failed to see that the effect 
of its decision was to discriminate against a “never competent” person, thus 
emasculating the right to refuse medical treatment at the end of life for such persons.
 There was relatively little guidance from the New York courts in the first few 
years after the decision in Eichner and Storar as to what would constitute “clear and 
convincing” evidence. So when Selma Alderson retained me in 1985 to seek a court 
order permitting withdrawal of all medical treatment for her partner, Paxson 
Kimbrough—a man who had suffered a traumatic brain injury during an assault and 
who lay in a hospital bed in their apartment in a persistent vegetative state, sustained 
by a nasogastric feeding tube—I prepared for trial with few guideposts.
 I tried the case before then-Justice C. Beauchamp Ciparick, a judge of the New 
York State Supreme Court (New York’s trial court of general jurisdiction) for New 
York County. Justice Ciparick21 found that the evidence I had introduced regarding 
Mr. Kimbrough’s wishes failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard; 
she denied the application to withdraw the feeding tube and to cease other 
treatment.22 A reading of the decision will demonstrate how difficult it was at this 
time for residents of New York to make reasonable and rational decisions about life-
sustaining treatment, such as artificial nutrition and hydration, at the end of life. 
Justice Ciparick, in denying Ms. Alderson’s application, wrote that “[i]t is . . . 
inappropriate for the court to allow the family, guardian, conservator, or other third 
15. Id. at 378–79.
16. See id. at 380.
17. See id. at 373.
18. See id. at 373–74; In re Storar, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388, 391 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1980) (describing medical 
experts’ testimony on the extent of metastasis), rev’d, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
19. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 373–74.
20. See id. at 380–82.
21. Justice Ciparick became Judge Ciparick in 1993, when she was appointed to the New York Court of 
Appeals, New York’s highest appellate court. See Honorable Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, N.Y. Ct. of 
Appeals, http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/JCiparick.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
22. See In re Alderson, No. 90193/86, slip op. at 23–25 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 19, 1988).
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party to make such a decision [to withdraw treatment] for the patient or for the court 
to make the decision itself.”23
 In effect, the New York clear and convincing evidence rule perpetuated the 
authority of the state over the patient and the patient’s surrogate decisionmakers to 
make end-of-life decisions. In the struggle between autonomy and paternalism, the 
state was the victor. Even in the absence of bad faith,24 a rule of evidence prevailed 
over well-meaning and caring persons who knew the wishes of the patient far better 
than the judges who crafted the rule.
 In other states, the pendulum had swung to placing decisionmaking power in the 
hands of the patient or the patient’s representative. This shift in the nature of end-of-
life decisionmaking worked well, except in cases in which conservative voices would 
rouse the media and politicians to intervene, as occurred in the case of Terry Schiavo, 
which captured news headlines in 2005.25
 The clear and convincing evidence rule remained the law in New York until 
2010, when, after seventeen years of debate, the New York legislature passed the 
Family Health Care Decisions Act, thereby bringing New York in line with states 
that had accepted some form of substituted judgment. There had already been some 
movement to soften the rigid effects of the New York rule. The New York legislature 
had authorized limited substituted judgment with respect to do-not-resuscitate orders 
in 1987,26 and, by enacting the Health Care Proxy Law in 1990, gave a health care 
agent the right to make substituted-judgment and best-interests decisions.27
 New York’s legislature allowed substituted-judgment and best-interests decisions 
to be made for mentally retarded persons in 2003,28 thus specifically overturning the 
Storar decision. Fortunately, New York (for the most part) has joined the mainstream 
as a result of the passage of the Family Health Care Decisions Act in 2010, which 
allowed a surrogate to make end-of-life decisions.
 I began teaching the elder law course at New York Law School in 1992. Health 
care decisionmaking and end-of-life issues have been a major part of the course 
curriculum. While my students recognize that American jurisprudence has accepted 
23. Id. at 24.
24. Justice Ciparick also wrote in Alderson that “[t]he court truly sympathizes with the plight of Paxson 
Kimbrough and his loved ones. They have shown him nothing but intense devotion by bringing him 
back home and lavishing care upon him.” Id. at 25.
25. Sherrie Dulworth’s article in this publication examines the media reporting on the Schiavo case. See 
Sherrie Dulworth, From Schiavo to Death Panels: How Media Coverage of End-of-Life Issues Affects Public 
Opinion, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 391 (2013–2014).
26. See Act effective Apr. 1, 1988, ch. 818, 1987 N.Y. Laws 3140, 3143–46 (codified at N.Y. Pub. Health 
Law §§ 2960–66 (McKinney 2013)).
27. See New York Health Care Proxy Law, ch. 752, 1990 N.Y. Laws 3547 (codified at N.Y. Pub. Health 
Law §§ 2980–94 (McKinney 2013)).
28. See Act effective Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 500, § 3, 2002 N.Y. Laws 3376 (codified at N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. 
Act § 1750-b (McKinney 2013)). The law was expanded to include persons with developmental 
disabilities two years later. See Act effective Oct. 11, 2005, ch. 744, sec. 1(2), § 1750-a(2), 2005 N.Y. 
Laws 3585, 3585 (codified as amended at N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-a (McKinney 2013)).
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the principle that a patient enjoys the right to refuse unwanted treatment, and that 
such a right is not lost when a patient loses decisional capacity, lively classroom 
discussions have highlighted the many areas in which the law is unclear, is in dispute, 
or has not addressed frequent violations of patients’ rights.
 The idea for the symposium held at New York Law School on November 16, 
2012,29 grew out of my experience as an elder law attorney, my service as a board 
member of not-for-profit organizations engaged in advocacy with respect to end-of-
life issues, and my teaching career. I was delighted when the editors and the publisher 
of the New York Law School Law Review agreed to sponsor the symposium, and I 
embarked on a year-long task of developing the program for the symposium, assisting 
the able administrative staff, working with the Law Review publisher and student 
editors, and assembling speakers who would, in my view, be able to articulate the end-
of-life issues America faces and to contribute to positive movement towards solutions.
 The symposium addressed many of the critical issues of today, and, to some 
extent, the participants commented on these issues in their papers published in this 
issue of the Law Review.
 Kathryn Tucker, Esq., Director of Legal Affairs for Compassion & Choices, 
presented the keynote address, in which she addressed aid in dying, a practice that 
the nation has not yet come to grips with, notwithstanding the widespread public 
acceptance of it as a fundamental right. Ms. Tucker also presented her views about 
the future of end-of-life decisionmaking in general, including palliative care and 
“voluntary stopping eating and drinking” (VSED). In her paper, Give Me Liberty at 
My Death: Expanding End-of-Life Choices in Massachusetts,30 Ms. Tucker discusses 
these issues and focuses in particular on the 2012 legislative referendum in 
Massachusetts to legalize aid in dying that was narrowly defeated; she presents the 
position that, at least in states that do not expressly criminalize aid in dying, it might 
nonetheless be legal under existing common law as being consistent with best medical 
practices (meaning that physicians who engage in this practice would not be subject 
to criminal prosecution).
 Other symposium speakers addressed the widespread problem of health care 
providers improperly extending unwanted medical treatment, thus failing to honor 
patient choices even when they have been clearly expressed in a “living will,” by 
unambiguous oral statements, or through the instructions of a health care agent or 
surrogate. Lisa Comeau, Esq., a New York appellate attorney who represented the 
family in one of the leading cases holding that there is no tort of “wrongful living,”31 
discussed the extent of this problem and what remedies for it currently exist. Professor 
29. Freedom of Choice at the End of Life: Patient’s Rights in a Shifting Legal and Political Landscape. Video 
recordings of the symposium are available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/freedom-of-choice-at-the-
end-of-life-videos/.
30. Kathryn Tucker, Give Me Liberty at My Death: Expanding End-of-Life Choices in Massachusetts, 58 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 259 (2013–2014).
31. See Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (2d Dep’t 2009).
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Nadia N. Sawicki32 participated in this discussion at the symposium; in her article 
published here, A New Life for Wrong ful Living,33 she argues for and offers “an 
ultimately optimistic view about the viability of tort claims for wrongful prolongation 
of life” as the remedy for failure to follow patient decisions.
 Rev. Dr. Martha R. Jacobs34 discussed the effect of religion on public policy, 
practice, and legislation affecting end-of-life decisions, and offered some thoughts on 
how to find a fair balance between the rights and wishes of patients and religious 
doctrine that often causes hospitals to adopt policies that override those rights and 
wishes. Ann Neumann35 also discussed the interplay between religion and end-of-
life issues, and in her paper presented here, The Limits of Autonomy: Force-Feedings in 
Catholic Hospitals and in Prisons,36 she presents her views on how individual rights are 
affected by religious values and sociological attitudes.
 Speakers at the symposium also commented on the fairness of current laws in 
Oregon37 and Washington,38 two states whose legislatures have adopted39 physician-
provided aid in dying by statute, and in Montana, where the practice is now legal by 
virtue of a ruling by Montana’s Supreme Court that allows patients to obtain lethal 
medication from physicians. However, in all three states such assistance is only 
permitted when the patient is expected to die within several months. Assistance may 
not be provided to persons who suffer from long-term illnesses and are not deemed 
to be at risk of dying in the immediate future—for example, Alzheimer’s disease, 
Parkinson’s disease, or Lou Gehrig’s disease (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS)).40
 A few of the speakers weighed the propriety of laws allowing aid in dying that 
require the consent of a person with capacity to give informed consent in order for a 
physician to prescribe lethal medication, but that do not allow aid in dying for a 
person who is no longer able to give informed consent but had provided such consent 
in an advance directive executed when the person did have full capacity. Professors 
32. Nadia N. Sawicki is an Assistant Professor of Law in the Beazley Institute for Health Law & Policy at 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
33. Nadia N. Sawicki, A New Life for Wrongful Living, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 279 (2013–2014).
34. Rev. Dr. Martha R. Jacobs is an Adjunct Professor at New York Theological Seminary, and a Per Diem 
Chaplain for New York-Presbyterian Hospital.
35. Ann Neumann is the Editor of the Revealer, published by the Center for Religion and Media at New 
York University.
36. Ann Neumann, The Limits of Autonomy: Force-Feedings in Catholic Hospitals and in Prisons, 58 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 305 (2013–2014).
37. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, ch. 3, 1995 Or. Laws 12 (codified at Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 
127.800–897 (West 2013)).
38. See Washington Death with Dignity Act, ch. 1, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 1 (codified at Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013)).
39. In May 2013, Vermont’s governor signed into law an end-of-life bill passed by the state’s legislature. See 
generally Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5289 (West 2013).
40. See, e.g., Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215–25 (Mont. 2009).
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Paul T. Menzel41 and Bonnie Steinbock42 spoke to this issue at the symposium, and 
Professor Menzel addresses this issue in his article, Advance Directives, Dementia, 
and Eligibility for Physician-Assisted Death,43 arguing forcefully “that through clear, 
informed, and persistent advance directives, people should be allowed to direct their 
future deaths in the event of severe dementia” and that “[n]either current competency, 
terminal illness, nor unbearable suffering should be retained as strict qualifying 
conditions” for legalized aid in dying.44
 Professor Menzel also addresses the issue of whether the wishes of a now-
incapacitated patient that had been clearly expressed prior to the loss of the ability to 
provide informed consent—as a result of advanced dementia or stroke, for example—
should always be honored, even when an appropriate surrogate decisionmaker (a 
guardian, health care agent, or other statutory surrogate) concludes it is in the 
patient’s best interests not to do so. Should law and public policy require that the 
prior expressed wishes of the patient always prevail, or should such prior statements 
be discarded in favor of some current belief about what is “good” for the patient?
 Professor Thaddeus Mason Pope,45 among other speakers, considered the issue of 
“medical futility,” a term used to describe situations in which a physician believes 
medical treatment has no value and wishes to discontinue it, but the patient—through 
his or her surrogate decisionmaker—insists on continuation. Professor Pope analyzes 
this issue and presents some proposals for dispute resolution in his article, Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms for Intractable Medical Futility Disputes.46
 The symposium also looked at the concerns of certain persons with disabilities 
who believe that end-of-life advocacy organizations merely perpetuate societal refusal 
to provide adequate protections and services for them. Balancing the valid concerns of 
persons with disabilities with end-of-life advocacy is challenging.47 Professor Alicia 
Ouellette48 addresses this tension and offers some approaches in her article, Context 
Matters: Disability, the End of Life, and Why the Conversation Is Still So Difficult.49
41. Paul T. Menzel is a Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Pacific Lutheran University.
42. Bonnie Steinbock is a Professor of Philosophy at University at Albany, State University of New York.
43. Paul T. Menzel, Advance Directives, Dementia, and Eligibility for Physician-Assisted Death, 58 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 321 (2013–2014).
44. Id. at 323.
45. Thaddeus Mason Pope is Director of the Health Law Institute and an Associate Professor of Law at 
Hamline University.
46. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Intractable Medical Disputes, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. 
L. Rev. 347 (2013–2014).
47. Persons with disabilities from the organization Not Dead Yet picketed outside of the conference room 
where the symposium was being held.
48. Alicia Ouellette is Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Professional Development, and a Professor 
of Law, at Albany Law School.
49. In her article, Professor Ouellette references the picketing outside the symposium that was conducted 
by several members of Not Dead Yet. See Alicia Ouellette, Context Matters: Disability, the End of Life, 
and Why the Conversation Is Still So Difficult, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 371 (2013–2014).
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 Sherrie Dulworth, R.N.,50 discussed media treatment of end-of-life issues and 
the effect of reporting on public attitudes, policy, and outcomes. In her paper 
presented here, From Schiavo to Death Panels: How Media Coverage of End-of-Life 
Issues Affects Public Opinion, she demonstrates how this occurs by examining three 
particular situations.51
 David Muller, M.D.,52 discussed the current state of medical practice in many areas 
of end-of-life decisionmaking from a clinical perspective. David C. Leven53 discussed 
the current level of public education about end-of-life decisionmaking and how to 
improve public awareness and education about people’s rights, how to convince people to 
discuss end-of-life issues with their family members, and how to teach them to take 
steps to control their lives. Mr. Leven also addressed issues of physician education and 
recent legislation in New York dealing with these issues, and discussed how we should 
go about educating physicians and hospitals so that they better understand the needs of 
an aging population and accept that honoring patient’s rights is encompassed in patient-
centered medicine. Mr. Leven explores these questions in his article, Health Justice 
Denied or Delayed at the End of Life: A Crisis Needing Remedial Action.54
 Another topic considered during the symposium was the question of how the 
rights of incarcerated persons should be treated at the end of life. Commissioner 
Brian Fischer of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision (DOCCS), and DOCCS Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical 
Officer Carl J. Koenigsmann, addressed this issue and presented DOCCS’s position 
that prisoners’ rights at the end of life are respected in New York.
 The central theme of the symposium revolved around the question of how we treat 
America’s growing aging society, particularly the “oldest old.” Our approaches to this 
issue illuminate our morality and ethics as a nation. Law, ethics, medicine, science, and 
religion all have rules and values that intersect and influence public policy. Crafting a 
fair and just resolution for end-of-life issues that will be consistent with our democratic 
values will require the participation of all of these cohorts. I am confident that, after 
reading the papers published here, the readers will agree that the symposium has made 
a meaningful contribution to the kind of debate that Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
referred to when he wrote, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s most widely read opinion on 
the issue of aid in dying: “Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an 
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-
assisted suicide. . . . [T]his debate [will] continue, as it should in a democratic society.”55
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